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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN 
M. Ali Kemal 
 
“Property rights are vital to your freedom and inseparable from it. 
Without them, you are nothing more than a tenant paying taxes on 
property over which you have lost some, most, or all of your rights
1
.” 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Property rights are the core of economic development. Capitalism in America and 
Japan is successful because they have a good system of property rights [Desoto (2000)]. 
Protection of property against expropriation is one important yardstick against which 
foreign investors assess the risk of investment. Thus we should have better system of 
property rights with lesser corruption to increase investment and achieve ten percent GDP 
growth rate
2
.  
Ibid argues that property rights are essential for the people to believe in the 
market system and capitalism cannot be successful without having proper property rights 
system in the country. Secured property rights reduce the insecurity of land. It also 
reduces the workload of the courts to settle disputes and credit availability to small 
farmers is easier due to property ownership. Moreover, it generates tax revenues and 
prevents cost and time overruns in development projects involving land acquisition. Thus 
property rights are inverse transaction cost [Khan (2006; Page 3)] and increase efficiency 
[Demsetz (1967)]. 
Pakistan’s property rights system has several anomalies such as benami 
transactions and general power of attorney. There are several loopholes in the system 
through which big landlords with the help of authority personals avoid/evade taxes and 
create a scenario where the third (any other) party remains deprived off using the land.  
Corruption of authorities is an undeniable fact. Khan (2006) reported several 
cases of corruption in the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), which is the main 
registration authority in Lahore. Authority personals ask for bribe to issue allotment letter 
for an already purchased plot, accessing a file, giving NOC etc. 
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 This issue was discussed, among other issues, in the PIDE-LUMS seminar on “Law and Economics” in 
June 2006. 
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Designing property rights is the most concerned thing because we need to take 
care of customs and social norms in Pakistan in designing the formal rules otherwise 
enforcement would be very difficult. Enforcement is the most important element after the 
rules have been made. The enforcement should be done by third party who is neutral and 
acceptable to both the parties (buyers and sellers).  
In this study we are examining different problems of property rights in Pakistan, 
the ways to overcome those problems and how would it affect corruption. Section II 
describes importance or property rights; Section III explains the problems of property 
rights in Pakistan; Section IV illustrates the possible design of property rights in Pakistan; 
Section V examines the impact on corruption and Section VI draw conclusions of the 
study.  
 
II. IMPORTANCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Theory distinguishes between legal and economic property rights (e.g., Barzel 
(1997)). Ibid interprets economic property rights are the end and legal property rights are 
means to achieve the end. According to Coase (1960) both are two sides of the same coin.  
Secured property rights are the core of the market system to be functioned. Desoto 
(2000) argues that an important characteristic of capitalism is the functioning state 
protection of property rights in a formal property system where ownership and 
transactions are clearly recorded. He is very critical of the policies in the developing 
countries that farmers in most of the developing countries remain trapped in subsistence 
agriculture because developing countries have lack of such integrated system of property 
rights. Work of Desoto’s organization “Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD)” in 
Peru and El Salvador shows that property rights are the essential reforms helping both 
countries to reduce unemployment and poverty.  
Implementing law of registering titles will reduce the insecurity of land and 
enhances the marketability of land. In addition, it will reduce the workload of the courts 
to settle title disputes, enable implementation of land reforms, facilitate credit availability 
to small farmers, generate tax revenues by providing information that can be used to 
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check evasion of income tax, and prevent cost and time overruns in development projects 
involving land acquisition [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
Land registration and titling is the heated issue across developing countries to 
reduce poverty and better growth and development. Ali (2007) emphasize on those 
countries who have included land reforms as the major strategy to reduce poverty under 
PRSP (e.g., Sri Lanka) and criticized government of Pakistan for not doing the same. 
World Bank and neo – liberal school of thought ask for formalized registration and titling 
to ensure safe transferable land rights which can lead to economic growth and poverty 
reduction [Khan (2006); Page 3].  
Following Desoto (2000) many economists have argued that protection of 
property rights brings several benefits which includes, higher level of investment, better 
matching through higher level of trading, more labor supply and better access to credit 
[Tell, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2004); Page 23]. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2005; Page 
30) found that entitled families increased housing investment, reduced household size and 
improved the education of their children but effects of credit are modest and no effects on 
labor income. Field and Torero (2006) also found no evidence, for Peru, that titles 
increase the likelihood of receiving credit from private sector banks although the interest 
rates are significantly lower for titled applicants regardless of whether collateral was 
requested. Contrary to Galiani and Schargrodsky (2005), Field (2002) found substantial 
increase in labor hours and substitution of adult for child labor due to titling in Peru.  
Libecap, Calvert and Egertsson (1989; Page 1) defines property rights as social 
institutions, which functions to define the range of privileges granted to the owner to a 
specific assets(s) including, selling of an asset, excluding non-owner from access to use, 
giving it on rent etc. According to Ibid property rights institutions can be in the form of 
formal and informal arrangements. Formal arrangements include constitutional 
provisions, statues, and judicial rulings, while informal arrangements include conventions 
and customs regarding the allocation and use of property.  
However, above disused arguments and findings are possible if the mindset of the 
people is changed. Mindset includes beliefs, habits and individual behavior. Tell, Galiani, 
and Schargrodsky (2004; Page 23) argues that property rights may change the beliefs of 
the people to pro–market direction. Once people start believing in the market system their 
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habits would be changed towards working for themselves and country. This will lead to 
change in individual behavior and overall mindset will change but how long that 
transition period will be is difficult to tell. For market system to work, the other policies 
should also be consistent with securing property rights.   
 
III. PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN 
The main problem in Pakistan is that the registration act of property rights 
envisages the registration of documents but not the registration of the titles. The 
documents of title provided by the seller to buyer are private documents relating to 
transactions between two private parties but do not certify the title. These documents 
confirm only one transaction, i.e., current transaction, in the whole chain of transactions 
[PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
The registrar, who registers the documents, records a transaction but cannot 
guarantee that the transaction is valid. He cannot refuse to register the document 
irrespective whether it is a fraudulent document. He is neither empowered nor required to 
question the transaction [Ibid]. In addition, state/government do not guarantee that the 
person mentioned in a land record is a true owner and if he/she is proved to be wrong 
later then the state/government could not be taken to the court. This system asks buyer to 
investigate the authenticity of seller’s property.  Khan (2006; Page 14) argues that the 
main emphasis of the registration process is on the identification of parties instead of 
identification of property.  
Names of legal successors are not recorded in the record of rights, hence, many 
legal owners do not have possessions and their names are not written in the relevant 
registers of the rights in land. This leads to never ending litigation and the overburdening 
of judiciary system.  
Oral declarations of gifts, under Islamic law, and inherited land do not have to be 
registered [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. Agriculture transactions, rural mutations, 
agriculture mortgages, wills and verbal transfers and gifts do not need to be registered 
[Khan (2006); Page 18]. This law has a big loophole for the tax evaders. 
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Patwari is the main person in villages who records ownership and tenancy in 
register of record of rights under the land act of 1967. He also records mutation, 
inheritance and change in rights [Khan (2006); Page5]. These records are apparently 
evidence of ownership but not the conclusive proof of ownership [Ibid; Page 5]
3
. This is 
why, in case of disputes, courts are over stretched to decide land record cases because 
patwaris’ records are taken as one of the evidence of ownership but not the proof [Khan 
(2006); Page5].  
Khewat based system is a complicated system in rural areas of Pakistan [Ibid; 
Page 7]. Each khewat contains several parcels and each parcel has some marlas or kanals 
of land
4
. Suppose a family owns a land and they were allotted Khewat number 1. They 
have 10 parcels in khewat and each parcel contains 8 kanals of land. If they sell 2 kanals 
of land to someone else then the buyer will be in the same khewat and he has his share of 
land in any part of that khewat. If the buyer sells his portion of land to someone else then 
that person is also in the same khewat and the system gets more complicated. This 
complicated process is consolidated during the settlement survey but settlement surveys 
are not done since years
5
 [Ibid; Page 10]. System of Khewat is very flexible and can be 
done verbally which has several problems. The most immense problem among those is 
that if someone verbally lease or transfer the land and buyer do not register in time then 
that land can be transferred again to some third party
6
 [Ibid; Page 12].  
According to the 1967 Act, mutations need to be presented in the village common 
assembly. These assemblies are needed to inform about land transaction to the third party 
and serves the role to inform public and increase public supervision. But this procedure is 
not followed continuously and only 50 percent of the mutations are done through 
common assemblies [Burns (2005)].  
Year to year lease of property is under stamp duty Act of 1899 which gives an 
incentive to parties not to register for first year. Thus parties often enter into an 11 month 
contract to avoid registration and duty and then renew it after 11 months [Khan (2006); 
Page 18]. Similarly, power of attorney does not need to be registered. In this case owner 
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4
 Marlas and Kanals are the language used to measure the area of land. Each kanal contains 20 marlas and 
one acre is equal to 8 kanals. 
5
 According to rules, settlement surveys needs to take place after every 25 years [Khan (2006); Page 10]. 
6
 This problem can be resolved through third party enforcement. 
 6 
can appoint more than one attorney against a same property. Both the attorneys are 
equally capable of selling the property.  
Benami transactions are where a property is transferred to surrogate owner to gain 
undue advantage. It is generally done by feudals and large landholders to avoid 
redistribution of land by putting it in the name of servant, trustee or any other family 
member. These types of transfers increase the complexities in the record of rights [Ibid; 
Page 22] 
The records of rights are of fiscal variety [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. The 
present land records system dates back to 1850s and was essentially designed to collect 
tax on land rather than to document and hold land titles [Ibid and Khan (2006); Page 4 
and 5]. The person shown on records is presumed to be the owner and responsible for 
paying land revenue/property tax [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
Agriculture land record is maintained by board of revenue in provincial 
governments but in urban areas there is no single agency keeping the records of land 
[PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. Khan (2006; Page 6) elaborates that Excise and 
Taxation department (ETD) deals with urban areas of land in Punjab excluding some of 
the areas, such as housing authorities
7
. Certain housing authorities also keep land records 
of their own housing area and property records are also available at Tehsil sub-registry 
level. Hence, there is a multiplication of records – one can get it from ETD and other 
authorities.  
Lahore Development Authority (LDA) is the enforcement agency in the province 
of Punjab. Ibid (Page 25) argues that LDA seems to have very sophisticated procedure 
but her key informant interviews reveal that LDA is very corrupt and massive cases of 
fraud were found in the allocation/transfers of plots in Johar Town, which was the last 
scheme opened by LDA in 1980s. Another person reveals that often allottees needed to 
go to LDA office for five years to get the letter of allotment. Moreover, allotees/owners 
cannot access their file in LDA without paying bribe. Even a clerk of LDA had to pay 
bribe to his fellow colleague in the other department of LDA to get NOC for his small 
plot. However, if allotee is not influential and cannot bribe then he does not get his 
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jurisdiction of district governments [Khan (2006)]. 
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allotment letter and another allotment letter for the same plot is issued to other person and 
if he is also not influential and cannot bribe the officials then this process keep on going.  
Qabzah groups are one of the major problems. They illegally occupied the 
property of others and exhaust the original allotee to the point of despair and get the plot 
transferred to their names at a very low market price. Lack of transparency, poor 
governance, corrupt officials, political interference, ad hoc policies and influence of 
qabzah group are the main factors which contribute to the fragile property rights in LDA 
[Ibid; Page 27]. I believe that it is true for all the enforcement authorities working in 
Pakistan.  
 
IV. DESIGNINING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Designing property rights is the most important step. One need to see at the 
increase in transaction cost initially because the failure of formal land titling in Kenya is 
the result of the transaction costs of the registration process [Ensminger (1997; Page 
180)]. PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007) argues that it can be financed through increase in 
revenues and setting up some funds for it.  
North (1990: Page 53) argues that to get better outcomes we need to build formal 
laws based on cultural and social norms (informal constraints) and enforcement 
characteristics. One of the other reasons for the failure of land titling in Kenya is 
incompatibility with the all important social norms and organization without which 
people cannot produce or enforce anything [Ensminger (1997; Page 180)]. 
However, if people need to learn a totally different system then this might be the 
major informal constraint. Thus, it should be designed in such a way that the system 
would be formal, procedure remains the same and there should have third party 
enforcement which is neutral and acceptable to both parties. Third party enforcement in 
informal way will definitely reduce the transaction cost in the short run but in the long 
run in case of disputes the transaction cost will rise. On the other hand, doing it 
informally will reduce the potential revenues which a government can get otherwise. 
Thus formal third party enforcement is better as an enforcement agency.  
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Section III outlines main problems in the system of property rights system in 
Pakistan. However, the system can be cured by removing the anomalies such as Benami 
transactions and general power of attorney and introducing new techniques such as GIS 
system. Let’s look at some of the recommendations; 
1. Completely scrap the obsolete and dysfunctional systems managed by Patwaris, 
Tehsildars, Tapedars, and Mukhtiarkars and set up system of guaranteeing title to 
land rather than a system that merely serves the purpose of registration of documents 
[PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
2. GIS is a good way of enabling quick and efficient recording of title transfers. Though 
it will be expensive initially but it can be financed through increased tax revenues and 
setting up special fund for this purpose [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
3. There is a need to establish a centralized land registry system in the form of a central 
registration of title of the most expensive and commercially attractive land [PIDE 
Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
4. The provincial governments should give the responsibility of determining the title of 
land to the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD). This Department has the most 
complete and accurate record of urban properties in the province, and hence best 
suited to shoulder this burden [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
5. The Registration Department should be bifurcated and the section dealing with urban 
properties should be placed under the ETD department. Alternatively, the institutional 
arrangement proposed above can be placed under the Board of Revenue by 
establishing a Revenue Authority [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
6. As a first step in the long-term strategy to design and implement a system of title and 
registration. There should be a requirement for compulsory registration of all 
documents relating to property including sale agreements, declaration of gifts, 
awards, transfers, and powers of attorney. Any party claiming title through adverse 
possession should be required, within six months of acquiring such title, to register 
their claim. A system of registering deeds can provide the platform on which a system 
of registering titles can eventually be built [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
7. General Powers of Attorney should be abolished altogether [PIDE Policy Viewpoint 
(2007)].  
8. Benami transactions should be declared unlawful [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
9. Any suit with respect to any immovable property should be compulsorily registered 
with the Registrar of the High Court. The Registration Act and the Stamp Duty Act 
should be amended to reflect this. Moreover, by linking court records to the computer 
database of the Registrar, prospective buyers would be informed that the property is 
under litigation [PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
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10. Simultaneously, the government could start a process of converting presumptive titles 
into exclusive titles after preparing draft lists that would be open to public inspection 
for a period of 6 months, during which objections and disputes would be settled 
[PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)].  
11. One of the main reasons for the long delays in settling title disputes in the courts of 
law is the system of multiple appeals and revisions even in the case of a small 
property dispute. This system must be replaced by one in which a party in a civil 
claim does not have a right of more than one appeal. The final court of appeal should 
be the High Court, and not the Supreme Court, since property is a provincial subject 
[PIDE Policy Viewpoint (2007)]. 
12. Torrens system of land titling is a parcel based system, which is followed in the rural 
areas and is very successful in Australia [Khan (2006); Page 29]. Following this 
system people may not need to know entirely new system, which helps in reducing 
the transaction cost initially.  
13. One of the main problems identified in Section III was that main emphasis of the 
registration process is on the identification of parties instead of identification of 
property. Thus an authority needs to check the existence of property before getting 
sign the contract between the parties and should not put ask the party to check the 
authenticity of the existence of property. This evolves the issue of enforcement which 
should be formal system and done by the registration authority who are registering 
the titles.  
14. The enforcement authority should endure the legality of transaction, actual price of 
the property and buyer should pay the total amount to the seller as well as revenues to 
the revenue authority. 
 
V. IMPACT ON CORRUPTION 
Third party enforcement is a better idea for having good property rights law but 
pertaining to current system of development authorities or revenue boards it is extremely 
unlikely that it is going to happen on fair basis. Verdier and Thierry (1998) argue that 
contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and 
do not accept bribes. However, authors find that (1) it may be optimal to allow some 
corruption and not enforce property rights fully; (2) less developed economies may 
choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption; and (3) there 
may exist a 'free-lunch' such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to 
reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent. 
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North (1990; Page 58) says that third party enforcement would involve a neutral 
party with the ability, costlessly, to be able to measure the attributes of a contract. 
However, it is generally believed that people in the business of land transactions have 
very good public relationing in the registration departments and can manipulate the things 
in their favor. They can easily do it by bribing authority personals hence corruption will 
definitely increase. 
If formal rules are made in line with the social and cultural norms then 
registration authorities conduct the initial exercise easily and transaction cost would be 
lower
8
. This implies that parcel based system (similar to Torrens system) is generally 
known to the people involved in the land transactions, it is easy to adaptable under the 
formal system and regularly conducts the settlement survey helps in formalizing property 
rights with lower transaction cost. However, because the patwaris who have the registers 
of records have contacts with the revenue authorities and very good relations, in general, 
with the big (feudal) landlords, thus it is expected that corruption will increase under this 
system.  
Cancio (2007) argues that citizens demand corruption when legal institutions do 
not sufficiently protect private property rights. A general observation shows higher level 
of corruption associated with worse property rights condition (Ibid). However, Ibid’s 
analysis is based on cross country data and we cannot apply it on a single country that is 
in a transition phase of making property rights law. Ibid also suggest that if reformers 
wish to decrease corruption, they should focus on reducing citizen demand for it by 
ensuring that legal institutions provide genuine protection against asset predation. 
I would suggest here is the fair role of enforcement authority, i.e., they should 
treat everyone equally and in a justified way. Moreover, we need to change our habits 
and role of individual behavior is very important for it. Unless enforcement authority 
does not do their work with honesty and sincerity, people will not believe in the system 
and the mindset of the people will not be changed. On the other hand if the individual 
behavior (mindset) and habits are changed that each individual do not bribe the 
authorities to have their work done, then the corruption will definitely decrease.  
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 Ensminger (1997; Page 192) argues that complementarity between formal and informal institutions is 
crucial to successful property rights change. 
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Most important, if the punishment and enforcement of punishment for taking and 
giving bribe is very strong then people and authorities would fear of punishment and 
corruption will be reduced. This would change the habits and behavior of the people.  
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Property rights are the core of economic development. The paper discusses 
importance of property rights, problems in the property rights in Pakistan, possibility of 
designing property rights in Pakistan and its impact on corruption.  
The study concludes that there are lots of anomalies in the current property rights 
law which needs to be abolished such as benami transaction and general power of 
attorney. Moreover, single authority should be set up, which ensures the titles of the land 
rather than registers the documents only. The process should be under the Excise and 
Taxation Department of each province because provinces deal in the property. In 
designing property rights law we need to make formal laws which compliments informal 
norms, otherwise it would be difficult to implement. However, this system will increase 
corruption because people in the business of land transactions have very good public 
relationing in the registration departments and in that case corruption will not decrease 
because they can sue their contacts and power to maneuver things.  
The study prefers Parcel (Torrens) based system because it is generally known to 
the people and the rules will be formed by taking informal constraints into consideration. 
Thus it is easy to adapt and helps in formalizing property rights with lower transaction 
cost. However, because the patwaris who have the registers of records has contacts with 
the revenue authorities and very good relations, in general, with the big (feudal) 
landlords, thus it is expected that corruption will increase in this process. 
Informal system of third party enforcement would reduce the transaction cost in 
the short run, if the two parties are agreed to that neutral third party. However, in the long 
run the transaction cost might increase in case of severe disputes between the parties and 
government would definitely be losing potential revenues. 
Titling and registration of property rights in a formal way, coherent with informal 
constraints, would definitely increase corruption in the short, i.e., in the period of 
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transition. But in the long run when the system is setup we can hope that the extent of 
corruption will decrease. However, fair role of enforcement authority will change the 
belief of people in the system. On the other hand if the individual behavior (mindset) and 
habits are changed that each individual do not bribe the authorities to have their work 
done, then the corruption will definitely decrease. Most important, if punishment and 
enforcement of punishment for taking and giving bribe is very strong then people and 
authorities would fear of punishment and corruption will be reduced. This would change 
the habits and behavior of the people.  
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